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ABSTRACT
Critical pedagogy, once the prominent new paradigm in educational discourse, is
practically absent from it now. Many writers attribute this to its lack of practical
consequences. In this article, however, the authors investigate its underlying model
of personal identity as an aim of education. This model, with its emphasis on
consistency and rationality as a source of human agency, is a typical product of the
“modern” way of thinking. In the light of the discussion of postmodernity, it can no
longer be taken for granted. It is suggested that another model, based on a dis-
cursive theory of identity along Vygotskian lines, may present more adequate pos-
sibilities for specifying the aims of education. One aspect of critical pedagogy
should not be lost, however, that is, its emphasis on the political nature of educa-
tion and the necessity of an ethical discourse about its aims.
INTRODUCTION
Emancipatory-critical pedagogy (or critical pedagogy for short) is a rela-
tively young “paradigm” in thinking about education. It derives both its
name and its basic conceptualizations and interests from the so-called
critical theory, the sociological and philosophical theory of the neo-Marxist
Frankfurt School, which originated around 1930. In the 1970s it was hailed
by many as a viable and vigorous alternative to both the nomological and
the interpretive traditions in the social sciences, especially in the field of
education. The first proponents of critical pedagogy were Germans like
Klafki, Mollenhauer, and Lempert, but similar theories rapidly developed
in the Anglo-American area. Critical pedagogy was considered by many to
be, if not the ultimate, at least the best available paradigm for education,
synthesizing (according to its own pretensions) all previous approaches
with a clear critique of the societal conditions of education.
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The position of critical pedagogy at this moment, however, is quite
different from these expectations. In the relatively short period since it
originated, critical pedagogy has met with fierce criticism. For instance, on
June 9, 1993, the prominent German educationalist Jürgen Oelkers pub-
lished an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a daily newspaper. This
contribution was entitled “Sentenced to Education. After Twenty-Five Years:
The Effects of Emancipatory Pedagogy” (Oelkers 1993). His assessment of
emancipatory pedagogy was really something. He characterized it as a
mishmash of moral judgments and experiment, based on the one hand on
critical ideas about society and on the other on an abstract idea of the
child, reminiscent of Rousseau. According to Oelkers, it deals with the
nature of the child as a construct of general liberation, but hardly with
actual children. Because of the emphasis on “the nature of the child” and
on the “societal liberation,” emancipatory pedagogy comes close to the
position of the progressive (reform) pedagogy of the first decades of this
century. The special “strength” of emancipatory pedagogy, according to
Oelkers, is its negative attitude.
Although Oelkers’s analysis is especially directed at the theoretical
tradition in postwar Western European pedagogy generally called anti-
authoritarian pedagogy, which is only a part of the broader stream of
critical-pedagogical thinking, it is indicative of the deluge of criticism di-
rected at many aspects of critical pedagogy. The greater part of this criti-
cism was directed at its (supposed) lack of practical results. We will say
more about this criticism later. For now, it is sufficient to say that for this
and other reasons, of which the waning interest in Marxist theory after the
fall of the Soviet Union is not the least, critical pedagogy is now considered
by many to have been a stillborn child that is interesting mainly for his-
torical reasons. The very few remaining proponents of critical pedagogy
are almost seen as relics of bygone times. In the postmodern era, its pre-
occupation with emancipation and the wrongs of society seems outdated.
As we will explicate below, some of the basic categories of critical ped-
agogy are indeed founded in a typically “modern” way of thinking and
ought to be revised in a fairly fundamental way—as some of its adherents,
such as Giroux and McLaren, have been doing. Our analysis, however, is
not directed at the practical results of critical pedagogy or at its analysis of
contemporary society and its pedagogical problems, but at its basic peda-
gogical categories: the way it conceptualizes personal identity as the aim of
education.
To develop such a pedagogical critique of critical pedagogy, we first
position and contextualize this pedagogy as to its origin in critical theory,
its aim, and as a form of criticism. Our interest in this venture derives from
our conviction that the orientation—the commitment—of critical peda-
gogy is still valuable, that is, its explicitly taking into account, both theo-
retically and practically, the (societal) political nature of education and
pedagogy. Our thesis, however, is that this commitment has not been ad-
equately translated into a valid pedagogical theory. In the conclusion, we
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will indicate in what direction we can go for a reformulation that preserves
this commitment, by elaborating a Vygotskian point of view.
THE COMMITMENT OF CRITICAL THEORY
Critical theory, the philosophy that critical pedagogy takes as its point of
reference, is a reflection on the relation between individual and society,
developed from a neo-Marxist point of view. Its central anthropological
contention is that everyone has a real interest in a rational and reasonably
organized society. However, it rejects the Hegelian view on which history
itself develops according to a transcendental principle. For critical theory,
history is a basic category; if anything is to warrant a course of history in the
direction of a more rational society, it must be a principle immanent in
history. Marx claimed to have formulated exactly such a principle. After
World War II, however, Horkheimer and Adorno lost their optimism about
the development of societies in a more rational direction. Their former
view of history as a process of enlightenment, of increasing liberation from
and control over nature, had been turned upside down. Rational reflection
as a means of controlling nature has become a goal in itself and thereby has
turned against the interests of humanity. Rationality has become purely
instrumental rationality, a technological power relation. Individual and
collective do not have a grip on, and are powerless against, a world con-
trolled by the truncated rationality of the sciences. The dialectic of en-
lightenment is a threat to human beings and to humanity as such
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1987).
Horkheimer and Adorno agree that it is impossible to go back to a
situation without technology or distance from nature. But what can form a
counterweight for absolutistic power pretensions (Baars 1987, 66)? By the
influence of the Enlightenment, the historical process of development has
become irrational, so the principle of development immanent in history
has been perverted. For the powerless individual hardly anything is left.
For Horkheimer, only nostalgia and hope remain. Adorno points to the
possibility of anger about such a total negativity. Sublimated in reflection,
it can become a power for resistance. Adorno concludes that we may find
this source in art and in theory as the only existing forms of critical praxis.
He points to theory and art as forms of critique, that is, as ideology critique,
which implies they leave out the practical-political actions completely.
Habermas has pointed in another direction in his voluminous work in
which he deals with one central question: “What did go wrong with the
rationalization process that went with the originating of the modern West-
ern societies?” (Kunneman 1983, 7). To understand Habermas’s commit-
ment, we quote him from an interview.
I have a conceptual motive and a fundamental intuition. This, by the way, refers
back to religious traditions such as those of the Protestant or Jewish mystics, also to
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Schelling. The motivating thought concerns the reconciliation of a modernity
which has fallen apart, the idea that without surrendering the differentiation that
modernity has made possible in the cultural, the social and economic spheres, one
can find forms of living together in which autonomy and dependency can truly
enter into a non-antagonistic relation, that one can walk tall in a collectivity that
does not have the dubious quality of backward-looking substantial forms of com-
munity. The intuition springs from the sphere of relations with others; it aims at
experiences of undisturbed intersubjectivity. These are more fragile than anything
that history has up till now brought forth in the way of structures of communi-
cation—an ever more dense and finely woven web of intersubjective relations that
nevertheless make possible a relation between freedom and dependency that can
only be imagined with interactive models. Wherever these ideas appear, whether in
Adorno [. . .], in Schelling’s Weltalter, in the young Hegel, or in Jakob Böhme, they
are always ideas of felicitous interaction, of reciprocity and distance, of separation
and of successful, unspoiled nearness, of vulnerability and complementary caution.
(Dews 1986, 125)
In the course of Western history, intersubjectivity and preservation have
given way to control and conquest. It is the task of a critical theory of
society to make such changes visible and to criticize them, contributing in
this way to a rationalization (in a broader sense) so that the original order
may be reestablished—the way from chaos to harmony (cf. Keulartz 1992).
Habermas has tackled the problem of finding a principle immanent in
history that can at least guide our actions toward the rationalization of
modern Western societies by moving along two ways: first, with the help of
an anthropology of knowledge, better known as the theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests, and second, after his linguistic turn, with his embrac-
ing theory of communicative action.
In his anthropology of knowledge, Habermas (1971) strongly connects
to the early Frankfurt School. It is his contention that, in striving for a
technically perfect control over nature, we have lost the capacity to listen
to and to preserve nature. In Knowledge and Human Interests, he focuses on
the sciences and their anthropological embeddedness in society, and es-
pecially on the rationalization that finds its expression in the concept of a
critical science. Such a critical science, according to Habermas, is an em-
pirical science with a hermeneutical and a critical complement. The modi
of explanation (information), understanding (interpretation), and societal
critique (analysis) presuppose each other in a critical science. A critical
science is directed toward an equilibrium of control, consensus, and cri-
tique. To put it differently, critical science is a force of rationalization
because empirics, normativity, and criticism are reconciled in an integra-
tive conception of science.
The anthropology of knowledge was first of all an epistemological ex-
ercise to tackle the problem of the quasi-transcendental status of the
knowledge-constitutive interests. In Knowledge and Human Interests, Haber-
mas characterizes the societal process of rationalization as the movement
of the self-reflection of a macrosubject (cf. Habermas 1971, 62, 63). But
with his theory of communicative action (Habermas 1987–1991), Haber-
mas makes a move from a subject philosophical paradigm to an intersub-
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jective position. No longer is the relation of the subject to himself central,
but the relation of one subject to another is the issue at stake. Objectifi-
cation and instrumentalization are then interpretable as distortions of com-
municative action, and as a sign for distorted symmetrical relations. All
communication presupposes mutual understanding and consensus as its
aim. This idea of universal mutual understanding is intrinsic to language.
We received this quasi-empirical gift with our life form. On the basis of this
precondition for communication, Habermas formulates the regulative ideal
of the ideal speech situation. With it, expression is given to a particular
view of society. Everyone should be able to take part in a societal discourse
or should be able to start such a discourse. Further, all should be able to
give legitimations of their actions and should be able to challenge the
legitimations given by others (Miedema 1994a).
Central to the theory of communicative action is the theoretical distinc-
tion between system and lifeworld. The lifeworld constitutes a reservoir of
interpretations, of unproblematic background beliefs actualized in com-
municative action by means of validity claims. Systems may be described as
self-regulating contexts of action, coordinated around specific media such
as money and power. The systems like economy and the state have a re-
lieving function in relation to the lifeworld and are, in that sense, a factor
in the rationalization of the lifeworld. Systems, however, may penetrate the
lifeworld so that power and financial gains, rather than the orientation
toward understanding and consensus, become of central importance. In
such a case, the systems colonize the lifeworld (cf. Miedema 1994b). Nor-
mative criticism against this colonization by the systems can be articulated
only from within the lifeworld, because only there, according to Habermas,
will we find the locus of the quasi-empirical gift for mutual understanding.
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND ITS VARIETIES
Having positioned critical theory—the early Frankfurt School variant and
Habermas’s double design of this theory—we will now consider some re-
lated versions of critical pedagogy.
Inspired by the approach of critical theory, critical pedagogy concerns
itself with the question of the social embeddedness of education and its
inevitably political character in contemporary Western society. It shares the
conviction that all educational processes are essentially historical, and that
the history of modern Western society has led to a situation where the
results of education cannot be anything but problematical. The structure
of our society is such that current educational situations can only produce
either a disharmonic and internally divided or an ideologically curtailed
personality structure, depending on how one estimates the degree of dom-
inance of hegemonial culture. The aim of education which other theories
hold as a matter of course, the internally consistent person, can no longer
be regarded as a factual or even possible result of education under society’s
current conditions. In fact, education has deteriorated into Halbbildung
CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 49
(semi-education) (Sünker 1994). Transmission of knowledge has displaced
personality formation as the aim of education. Its primary function is to
ensure the production of persons who fit into existing societal structures.
Thus, critical theorists are pessimistic about the possibilities of education in
our society. They see existing education primarily as a means for continu-
ing suppression, not as a means for individual self-realization. Critical theory
inspired a wealth of studies and theories in the sociology of education
which underpin this thinking.
The theoretically important point in all this is not simply that historical
processes have put the education of mankind into danger. Rather, it is that
history itself has become the basic category of the theory, and transcen-
dental principles of personality development are rejected. In this respect,
it differs fundamentally from other pedagogical thought systems. Gener-
ally, these have supposed that some universal principle is at work, the
normal result of which is that every human being forms an identity, that is,
a self-conscious, consistent, and rational way of relating herself to the world
in its actions. Politics, or the structures of society, only plays a role as
accidental circumstances which may prohibit the full deployment of such
principles, but are not seen as theoretically relevant for psychology or for
educational theory.
The theorists of the progressive education movement (Reform peda-
gogy), for instance, strongly tended to understand personal identity in
terms of a capacity innate in every individual, which only has to be discov-
ered (Rousseau) or at most needs an adequate environment to be able to
express itself. Consequently, education is limited to the creation of such
environmental conditions. These conditions mainly concern a safe emo-
tional climate in which the child is encouraged to engage in exploration,
and a stimulating physical and social context in which exploration can lead
to learning. Some of these theorists hold that personal identity will result
more or less automatically from the (stimulated) growth of a principle
innate in every human being. Seen in this way, identity is a “product of
nature,” and learning about the physical and social environment is made
possible only by the development of this identity.
In Piaget’s theory, this relation between human nature and environment
has been reversed. Identity results from the continuous interaction (equil-
ibration) of the actual level of development of the individual, on the one
side, and the characteristics of the environment, on the other side. The
more thinking and acting are tuned to the actual characteristics of the
environment, the more consistent they will become. Thus, for Piaget,
the fixed point that must ultimately warrant the consistency of action is
found in the universal structure of reality, not (as in progressive pedagogy)
in the structure of humanity.
German hermeneutic pedagogy (Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik) finds
this Archimedean point in culture itself, that is, in its universal aspect. In
this respect, it is the continuation of classical German humanist Bildungs-
theorie : “According to a standard encyclopedia of the Weimar period, ‘Bil-
dung’ as a process begins with a unique ‘individuality’ which then develops
into a ‘formed or value-saturated personality’ through hermeneutic inter-
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action with the ‘objective cultural values’ transmitted by venerated texts.
The outcome, also called ‘Bildung,’ is a personal state characterized by ‘a
certain universality, meaning richness of mind and person,’ along with
‘totality, meaning inner unity and firmness of character’ ” (Ringer 1993,
680ff.). Hermeneutic pedagogy widens the concept of “text” to imply any
type of appeal that culture makes to humans. For it is culture that lifts
humans above the state of animals, and liberates them from the coercion
of given situations, thus making possible planned and insightful, rational
behavior. It is the cultural construction of meaning that makes the devel-
opment of person and identity possible as it is internalized. Learning and
development are exclusively related to the hermeneutic relation between
the individual and the “objective cultural values.” Cultural meanings are
not just instruments or competencies which a person does or does not
know how to use; they actually are the formative elements for the person
himself. Values and views that form the foundations of culture and society
also come to underlie the individual’s actions and judgments. On the other
hand, identity is not imposed; it is not wholly heteronomous. Identity is
seen as an active construction by the individual, who uses and transforms
the culture she finds herself in. This implies that the cultural context
determines the possibilities of the establishment of personal identity. It
forms, so to speak, the “developmental substance” for identity formation.
In an even more pregnant way, this becomes visible in the theory of
George Herbert Mead, who takes the social community rather than objec-
tive culture as the important factor. According to Mead, consciousness and
self-awareness are social products. They consist of internalized social ex-
pectations (the “generalized other”) that ultimately form the core of the
person, the “self.” With this theory, Mead emphatically opposes the phi-
losophy of consciousness (which underlies, among others, the progressive
education view), which holds that “the agency of the subject can only be
maintained by keeping it in a sense ‘pure’ from external, socio-cultural
influences” (Biesta 1994, 303).
The important step in critical pedagogy is its denial of the existence of
a transcendental principle of personality formation. Still, the educational
aim of the consistent and self-identical person as such is maintained in
critical theory. It obtains the status not of an actual aim but of a counter-
factual ideal. This is what “emancipation” really seems to be about: the
realization of an educational ideal which under current circumstances in
society is denied. Inevitably, as in general critical theory, the problem now
becomes whether we can find some force or principle immanent in history
which, although not guaranteed to yield the desired outcome, may at least
guide our actions toward the realization of emancipation. The answers to
this problem differ.
Cultural and Natural Niches
Many critical educationalists have adopted the view that, if it is contempo-
rary capitalist Western culture that is corrupt and corrupting, it should be
possible to find areas where this corrupting effect has not been able to
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penetrate. The catchword here is “authenticity.” It is sought in two direc-
tions. Some educationalists think that such areas might be found where
hegemonial capitalist culture has not totally dominated other Western cul-
tures, for instance working-class culture, or in cultures that have been
protected from Western influences, as in the “grass roots” of non-Western
population groups. On the other hand, sometimes all culture is suspected
of being corrupt, and the search then is for areas where society can only
marginally penetrate or not penetrate at all the “nature of the child” which
is the cornerstone of the antiauthoritarian and psychoanalytic critical ped-
agogies as criticized by Oelkers, or the body as opposed to mind. In each
case, the starting point for liberation is found in manifestations of resis-
tance: the resistance of oppressed groups in society against the domination
of hegemonial culture, the resistance resulting from experiences of incon-
sistency and incompleteness that people can have in critical circumstances
(Giroux 1983, 1989; Freire 1970, 1973, 1985), the opposition of an indi-
vidual personality strengthened by a free education against the power of
institutions (Von Braunmühl 1980; Miller 1980), or the resistance of the
body to the “inscription” of coercion from society (McLaren 1995).
What such theories amount to is that they try to disengage education
and personality formation from the actual course of history, because this
course is valued negatively in the light of the ideal of personality consis-
tency and identity. The danger inherent in such a course is the reintro-
duction of ahistoric and even transcendent principles, making the theoretical
apparatus inconsistent.
Emancipatory Knowledge
A very different position in critical theory is that of Jürgen Habermas. His
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests culminates in the idea of an
emancipatory interest in knowledge. Every human being and hence every
child must be given the possibility by way of analysis, criticism, and self-
reflection to develop into a freely self-determining and rationally acting
person. These possibilities for self-determination must not be limited by
material power, ideologies, or prejudice. The concept of emancipation
provides an anthropological model that is both dynamic and formal. A
consequence of this formal character is a formal concept of child raising.
Several definitions of emancipation have been given in critical pedagogy.
Mollenhauer (1977), for instance, called emancipation in child raising the
process by which young people are liberated from the conditions that
restrict their autonomy and competence in self-reflection. In Lempert’s
(1969) view, emancipation is the process of setting people free from the
compulsion of material power, as well as from ideologies and prejudices,
with the help of analysis, critique, and self-reflection. For Klafki (1970,
1971), at the individual level, child raising is aimed at self-reliance, self-
responsibility, and self- and co-determination. Socially it is directed at
sociability and solidarity.
In Habermas’s view, emancipation is a kind of social development that
can also be interpreted as an edification process of the human species. If
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the anthropological picture here is not static but dynamical, not material
but formal, then in each and every historical societal situation it has to be
decided what the content of the emancipation should be. Although this
provides an openness to the actual use of the concept of emancipation, it
causes at the same time a very pressing practical problem: how to realize
emancipation on the concrete level of education as a process and as action.
This is the problem that gave rise to the criticisms of critical education
mentioned earlier, which focused on the problematical relationship of this
pedagogical theory with pedagogical praxis. Even in the cradle of Western
European critical pedagogy itself, West Germany, critical educationalists
themselves, not without irony, have called it a philosophy of science with-
out a science, and concluded that a concrete material object was absent.
Critical pedagogy has been criticized as a pedagogy that stresses theory,
that is merely capable of criticism, of producing a formal concept of child
raising, but without being able to offer directions for action (cf. Blankertz
1978). In the 1980s, the growing criticism of this pedagogy in the Western
European countries increased the pressure. The ultimate question was
whether the founding metatheoretical concepts like “critique,” “emanci-
pation,” “understanding” (Verstehen), and “action” could be developed in
the direction of a fully fledged pedagogical paradigm. Central in the eman-
cipation approach of critical pedagogy was the presupposition that peda-
gogical and political-societal emancipation can be realized by means of
criticism. One of the core inadequacies of the emancipation approach,
however, was the incapacity to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
Going along this line no practical directions for action could be offered to
practitioners. Precisely such directions were expected by practitioners in
the schools. Even theoreticians concluded that a critical approach that can
offer only critique, that is not able to give any directions for concrete
practices, leaves the practitioners to their own resorts. Such a critical ap-
proach is in itself conservative (cf. Kamper 1978).
To avoid this pitfall, and thus to mediate between theory and practice,
action research was promoted as the critical method par excellence for
developing cooperation among all the parties involved: scientists, profes-
sional practitioners such as teachers, helpers, parents, and children. If
critical pedagogy is to be seen as a theory of child raising with a direct,
concrete relation to its flesh-and-blood subjects, then such a process of
cooperation is necessary. We will not elaborate here on the worst-case
reconstruction of critical action research (Miedema 1987), but just point to
some conclusions. Cooperation processes in action research very often ran
into serious problems. Communication problems frequently caused the
discontinuation of projects. Reports of critical action research projects that
have been completed, let alone have been successful, are rather rare. The
praxis-alienation of critical pedagogy and the frequently negative pedagog-
ical character of this pedagogy (i.e., critical pedagogy does not contribute
in a constructive critical way to concrete pedagogical thinking and acting),
and the failures around action research (perceived as the paradigmatical
method of critical pedagogy), have been instrumental in the negative at-
titude toward critical pedagogy that now prevails.
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Communication
Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action gave a new impulse to critical
pedagogy. As noted before, here he claims that there is indeed a principle
immanent in history to guide our actions, or rather, this principle is im-
manent in language. The possibility of the formation of a consistent iden-
tity is not found within the individual but on the intersubjective level, in
the supra-individual structures of language. This movement exactly paral-
lels the movement of Piaget in relation to progressive pedagogy. We should
recall that Piaget, too, postulates a formal and external principle, instead
of the vitalistic appeal to an innate rudiment of personal identity. Thus, it
is certainly no coincidence that Habermas makes extensive use of Piaget’s
developmental theories, generalizing his phase model of individual devel-
opment to a model of the development of societies. As Young (1990, 15)
writes: “It is our constant attempts to free ourselves from the limiting
conditions of each epoch of our own self-formation that is the motive force
of our history of humanity.” According to this model, the “history of hu-
manity” is, notwithstanding the pessimism of the earlier critical theorists, a
progressive history of rationality. This does not imply a steady progression
in any society: we should distinguish the logic of development from the
empirical dynamics of the actual process. Habermas endorses the position
that in our society, the structures of interaction in which individuals par-
ticipate do not realize the ideals implicit in language use and are oppress-
ing. Emancipation for Habermas is an abstract utopian ideal that expresses
the need to do away with such structures. Thus, along the Habermasian
line of legitimation, the aim of communicative competence in education is
related to the regulative societal ideal of the “ideal speech situation.” This
ideal has a quasi-empirical or quasi-transcendental status, because, accord-
ing to Habermas, there is not and will never be a society that meets this
ideal. As soon as he tries to make this utopia more concrete, however,
Habermas refers to the ideal of consistent personal identity. The structures
of communication that individuals internalize being neither harmonious
nor consistent, the implication for contemporary education is that, to
reach individual rationality, the individual needs the competency to dis-
tance himself from internalized role positions and to reflect on and inter-
pret these positions. Thus, identity no longer coincides with the internalized
role patterns, the generalized other, but is elevated to a formal level. Iden-
tity presupposes distance from the Self and the ability to handle different,
mutually inconsistent roles. The individual in contemporary society must
learn not to play a role, but to play with roles.
Given this position, it becomes understandable that some critical peda-
gogues, like Klafki and Mollenhauer, have opted to declare “communica-
tive competency” the new aim of education. For this, competency does not
mean just being able to speak and write. It implies the competency for
self-determination, for participation in democratic decisions, and for sol-
idarity. This seems a fair description of the idea of identity. Like Habermas,
Klafki and Mollenhauer give no more than formal explication of this uni-
versal aim of education. In concrete historical situations, the contents and
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procedures will differ, as long as they can be shown to lead toward the
ultimate goal. In their case, too, this goal is bound to the ideal of consistent
personal identity.
Utopia
Another way of legitimation is given by Giroux. He wants to avoid every
form of transcendentalism in a plea for a substantial position that takes the
“materiality of human interaction” seriously, and wants to “move from
criticism to substantive vision” (Giroux 1989, 37, 59). “(R)adical pedagogy
needs to be informed by a passionate faith in the necessity of struggling to
create a better world. In other words, radical pedagogy needs a vision—one
that celebrates not what is but what could be, that looks beyond the im-
mediate to the future and links struggle to a new set of human possibilities.
This is a call for a concrete utopianism” (Giroux 1983, 242). In relation
with his concrete utopia, Giroux speaks of a politics of hope, a language of
possibility and morality. Instead of the quasi-transcendental ideal speech
situation, Giroux’s criterion is the project to be realized, the world of the
“not yet,” because of the “necessity and importance of developing a dis-
course of ethics as a foundation for the kinds of decisions about classroom
knowledge and pedagogy that teachers often face on a daily level” (Giroux
1989, 107, our emphasis).
In a few very provocative contributions to the debate about communi-
cative action and pedagogy, Masschelein (1991a, 1991b, 1994) argues that
it is only from the perspective of the intersubjective matrix that the process
of subject-production or subject creation is understandable. Intersubjec-
tivity is the prerequisite for subjective acting and understanding. Based on
this paradigm of intersubjectivity, he poses the question whether critical
pedagogy is really in need of a project, a vision, a utopia, a quasi-
transcendental criterion (cf. Masschelein 1991a). If we take democracy and
the dialogue really seriously, says Masschelein, then we need not blow up
the consensus by quasi-transcendental ideas or vague utopian visions. All
citizens in a democracy are supposed to have the possibilities to develop an
opinion. This is the concept of democracy as a fact and not as a project!
The empty space between human beings (and here Masschelein is refer-
ring to Hannah Arendt) should not be filled in before the struggle or
before the dialogue. Education and pedagogy must be uncoupled from
individual or collective self-realization and self-determination. The empty
space, the public sphere, must be its point of reference. The starting point
is the irreducible appearance of the plurality of human beings, communi-
cating themselves as absolutely unique human beings (cf. Masschelein 1994).
AN EVALUATION OF CRITICAL PEDAGOGY
By now, it will have become clear that, contrary to the opinion of many, we
think that the lack of practical consequences as such is not the main reason
for the downfall of critical pedagogy. Nor do we think it justified to dismiss
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it solely because it rests on neo-Marxist views that have become unfashion-
able. We do believe that, as a whole, critical pedagogy does not have the
potency to be the successor of other pedagogical paradigms; but this con-
viction is based on a deficit in its pedagogical ideas, on its belief in the
necessity of a consistent identity as the ultimate aim of education.
We do not think identity is a superfluous concept. On the contrary, the
pedagogical way of thinking is characterized by the question of the quality
of the development of identity or (as it is called in some theories) person-
hood. In the absence of this perspective, pedagogy degenerates into a
sociology of education or a psychology of development. Any pedagogical
theory is ultimately about the question of the quality of actorship to be
acquired by the educated. For, unless cultural transmission is understood
as a totally mechanistic and determined form of socialization (in which
case only a bordercase of pedagogical theory remains), the aim of this
transmission is always that the child learns to give meaning and act socially
in an autonomous way according to her own judgment. Besides the acqui-
sition of competencies, this asks for the development of personal identity:
being aware of yourself as a continuously judging and acting person. With-
out this awareness, rational activity is unthinkable.
The idea that a consistent and uncontradictory identity is a necessary con-
dition for being an adequate subject as a source of “agency,” however, may
be characterized as a typical product of modernity. It is part of the image
of human beings as striving to emancipate themselves from the coercion of
nature and of tradition. The idea of a free and self-aware humanity is the
essence of the modernity movement. We can really only see this in the
postmodern era, where this premise is no longer taken for granted. This
seems to imply, however, that we can also not take for granted the idea of
human agency, of the subjective character of human activity. The realiza-
tion of this agency has until now been considered the ultimate aim of
education. Critical pedagogy, for all its emphasis on historicity, has proven
itself to be part of the modern way of thinking by adhering to this aim
unquestioningly.
This, however, leads to an inconsistency in critical theories of education.
If a universal principle is maintained, even as part of a counterfactual ideal,
this principle itself is by its very universality placed outside the realm of
history, and thus, of politics. Becoming human is, in truth, only partly
conceived of as a social and political process. For another part, and it is
exactly this part for which critical pedagogy is the cornerstone of educa-
tion, it is seen either as a “natural” process or (as with Habermas) as a social
but universal and thus apolitical process. This implies a tendency to de-
politicize all thinking and speaking about the formation of human beings.
Fundamental for critical pedagogy is a dualistic conception, in which po-
litical circumstances are incidental, but becoming human is universal and
thus not really political; in which actual structures of society and person-
ality are discordant, but the ideal for humanity and human society (which
Habermas ties to the ideal speech situation) is concordant and free of
inconsistencies. It is exactly this dualism which seems problematical and
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implausible in the light of postmodern theories. For it implies the exis-
tence of knowledge untainted by power.
This leads to the question of whether education can exist at all without
the ideal of identity formation. We think the answer must be that we cannot
do without the concept of identity, but we do not need the specific inter-
pretation that modernity gives to this concept. It is not only the postmod-
ern philosophers, but also the psychologist and educationalist Vygotsky (if
read, that is, in the “semiotic” interpretation inspired by his contemporary
Bakhtin), and those he inspired (e.g., Harré and Gillet 1994; Lemke 1995).
A DIRECTION FOR REFORMULATION
The positions just mentioned leave behind them the ideal of a consistent
identity. Instead, they radicalize Mead’s position that thinking is equal to
internalized conversation. Not the individual, but the social situation is the
basic element in thinking about humanity. The boundary between inner
and outer world does not coincide with the skin, but is situated within the
individual. Moreover, it is not a fixed boundary. Individual identity is
created again and again, for a short period, in a specific situation, and
before a specific public. Identity is not a given, but an activity, the result of which
is always only a local stability. This activity is not one of balancing between
the expectations of others and those of the individual himself. Rather, the
balancing act is between different expectations which have each been partly
internalized. Within every person there are different voices, which can be,
and usually are, contradictory. According to this theory, it is not useful to
postulate a separate authority, next to or above such voices, which could
coordinate activity from a sort of deepest personal level. Coordination
takes place in, and relative to, given social situations. Identity is not only
produced dialogically; it always retains a dialogical character.
For some commentators of “the postmodern condition,” accepting this
model of identity implies that postmodern human beings must be schizo-
phrenics. They hold the fact that under postmodern conditions no stable
structures of society exist any more that could ensure identity, responsible
for the internal contradictions within the individual. This would imply that
at an earlier stage in history, it was possible for individuals to reach a
unified identity. In fact, such comments exhibit a nostalgia for harmony,
characteristic of the modern, universalistic view of identity. A different
interpretation would be that a fixed and stable identity has always been an
ideological illusion, the true character of which becomes visible only under
current historical conditions. Of course, this does not imply that humans
have always been schizophrenic without knowing it. One can only come to
that conclusion if one keeps to the accepted view of personal identity. If,
however, we are prepared to leave that view, the question becomes why it
is that not everybody, even under postmodern conditions, becomes a schizo-
phrenic. If we are to understand identity in a different way, we need a new
theory of the development of identity.
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In short, a theory of the development of identity along Vygotskian lines
(cf. Van Oers 1993) would have the following characteristics. First, inter-
nalization should not be thought of as a transition from “outside” to “in-
side.” Rather, it is the transition from what a child can or wants to do in the
context of a social activity, “going above itself ” in the social relationship, to
what she can or wants to do individually and independently. That is, the
boundary between the not-yet and the already internalized repertoires lies
inside the individual. Such a theory, therefore, does not only deny that
something like an “authentic” human subject exists and needs only to be
developed; it goes on to deny that the individual is an adequate unity from
which to understand human identity. Identity becomes understandable
only in connection with social relations.
Second, however, the human subject is not understood as just the inev-
itable product of social factors. It is not the social structures themselves that
are internalized, but the meaning the individual learns to give to these
structures in his interaction with others and in relation to what he has
learned before. Internalization is an activity of the giving and incorpora-
tion of meaning, not a process of impression in which the individual re-
mains passive. Learning does not mean being fitted with a totally new
repertoire of behavior; it consists of qualitative changes in an already ex-
isting repertoire. So, the quality of the individual’s meaning-giving by means
of her environment is at stake. At the same time, learning means learning
about oneself: building perspectives on oneself in relation to the learning
situations one finds oneself in. This generates a certain continuity, without
taking the form of a unified perspective which could be called identity in
the accepted sense. In different situations, before different audiences, the
individual may be guided by different perspectives which may be partially
incompatible. Nor does learning have a definite end; as long as there is
contradiction in social relations, learning occurs and identity keeps chang-
ing. The theory has a positive attitude toward such change. An individual
who does not change anymore is dead, either literally or figuratively. The
same is valid for a culture or a society. Not harmony and homeostasis are
the ideal here, but continuous change. This holds on the individual level
(that is, the individual development does not have an end) as well as on the
societal level (we can only speak of “history” if and where development
takes place).
In the course of his or her development, each individual learns to han-
dle the facts of change and contradiction in a certain way: either negating
them or valuing them negatively, or seeing them as opportunities for de-
velopment and using them in a positive way. Thus, people learn to manage
their own development. Education can play a crucial part here by stimu-
lating certain ways of handling contradictions. The stimulation that Vygotsky-
oriented educators offer will go not in the direction of consistency by
closedness, but of openness. Contradictions should not be resolved or
covered too soon. A “pluralist attitude” (Rang 1993) is an aim of education
here. Ideology critique is aimed at situations that impede openness.
Returning to critical pedagogy, it is important to point out that it, too,
is aware of contradictions in the individual’s social environment. And in-
58 WILLEM L. WARDEKKER AND SIEBREN MIEDEMA
sofar as these do not seem present, this situation is regarded with distrust,
because this is probably the result of the work of ideology. Still, the reaction
of critical pedagogy to such a pluriform situation is different, because it
sticks to a “modern” conception of identity. Pluriformity is seen as a tem-
porary and potentially dangerous situation; ideally, identity should be formed
by a principle that is either outside that situation or (as with Habermas) in
the formal characteristics of interactive situations that transcend their pluri-
form accidental characteristics.
All this is not to say that critical pedagogy is totally wrong and should be
considered superseded by postmodern theories. The intentions of critical
pedagogy should be continued in postmodern theory in at least one area.
As has been noted before, there is an inherent danger of relativism in
postmodernity. If we reject the possibility of a universalist principle for
identity formation, are we then left without any point of reference for
values and norms, and is education ultimately without legitimation? Many
educators have an aversion to postmodern theories for exactly this reason.
But it is not an implication of the type of theory proposed here. Rather,
such a theory suggests that no automatic appeal to natural or transcendent
norms or values is possible. This implies that identity formation and the
development of the person are seen as thoroughly political enterprises, in
which the people concerned are responsible for choices made. As we have
shown, earlier theories of education have tended to depoliticize such choices,
by placing parts of the developmental process outside history. What is
needed here is a politics of identity formation that does not take individual
decisions as given but makes reference also to historical and societal cat-
egories. A postmodern conception that is based on relativism cannot do
this, because it also tends to deny history and replace it with mere social
change. What is lost is the standard of critique of society, and thus the idea
that there is a desirable direction to the development of society and of
rationality—which was the central element in critical theory. What a plu-
ralist postmodern theory of education needs is exactly such a theory of the
historical genesis of rationality, which speaks to the relationship between
the private and the public sphere, between the development of the person
and that of society. Biesta (1995) shows that the theory of Rorty on this
relation is inadequate to do this job. Another trial, as yet rudimentary and
worded in impenetrable Marxist jargon, but based on a Vygotskian view,
has been developed by Newman and Holzman (1993). According to them,
contemporary society makes it almost impossible to handle contrasts and
contradictions in a positive way, because they are covered up or valued
negatively. This implies that, in late capitalist society, the development of
the person (which they call a “revolutionary activity”) stops at the point
where existing structures should be transcended. In their development,
human beings are bound to, and made dependent on, the existing struc-
tures and cultural elements, which effectively implies the end of history.
This, of course, is valued negatively.
Such a theory, however rudimentary, shows that it is both necessary and
possible to have a place for ethical questions within a theory that does not
recognize universal premises. Such ethical questions are shown to be po-
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litical questions at the same time. Pedagogical theory is not made impos-
sible, but it faces the task of reformulating the premises and the aims of
education as political questions. At this moment, not many educationists
recognize this task. Even those working within a Vygotsky-inspired para-
digm do not always conceptualize education and development as political
enterprises. (A notable exception is Lemke 1995.)
A reformulation of pedagogical theory in this sense would have to ask
what the possibilities are for human beings in the actual political situation
not to be made totally dependent on existing structures. Put differently,
what possibilities are left for humans to become coauthors of the cultural
narratives, and what shape should education have to promote this actor-
ship or authorship? A more complete reformulation, however, would take
us far beyond the scope of our present discussion.
NOTE
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Thirteenth International
Human Sciences Research Conference, Hartford, CT, June 14–18, 1994, and in the
Department of Education, York University, North York, June 10, 1994.
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